ARC number: 3
(Technical Id number: 4)
| Author(s): | Lisdorf, Anders |
| Title: | The spread of non-natural concepts - evidence from the Roman prodigy lists |
| Category: | published article |
| Length (pages): | 23 |
| Keywords: | counter-intuitive; transmission; history; Roman religion |
| | | Abstract: | Pascal Boyer, Justin Barret and associates have recently developed precise and testable
hypotheses about what makes a concept attention-demanding, easier to recall and therefore
has increased probability of being transmitted. Two theses are tested: 1) that all else being
equal counterintuitive concepts are better remembered than bizarre, and bizarre better than
common; 2) that counterintuitive concepts containing certain templates, which involve the
activation of theory of mind expectations should have greater success. The research so far
has been in controlled experiments, but it should be possible to test the theses “in the
wild”. The evidence from the roman prodigy reports offers us such a possibility. It also
enables us to check for variation across time, which hasn’t been done before. Thesis 1)
is confirmed, but not thesis 2). It is argued however that this is not a disconfirmation of
Boyer’s general thesis. By considering the context it is argued that it does not disconfirm
the basic assumption of the theory. The evidence could suggest that when the “social
inferential potential” of templates activating TOM expectations is not used it has no
transmission advantage. It is also argued that the specific distribution shows that what
is normally considered local cultural factors, have a real effect on what is transmitted. |
| | | Remarks: | |
| | | Email: | andersl @ hum.ku.dk |
| Bibliography: | Lisdorf, A. 2004: "The Spread of Non-natural Concepts - Evidence from the Roman Prodigy Lists", The Journal of Cognition and Culture, nr. 4:151-173 |
| URL: | http://springerlink.metapress.com/content/k3xxb94ylcy51qm8/fulltext.pdf |
| | | Submitted: | 13/11/2006 09:09:23 (DD / MM / YYYY) | | Published: | 14/11/2006 12:39:43 (DD / MM / YYYY) |
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